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Abstract  
 
Global health law has emerged as an area of study and practice over the last fifteen years. 
Studies of the field to date have largely proceeded on the basis of a diffusionist and 
functionalist model sees legal initiatives emerging from global ‘centres’, such as 
Washington or Geneva, in response to new disease threats and a lack of capacity at the 
‘periphery’, say in Sierra Leone or southern China. This approach tends to neglect national 
institutions and contexts as decisive influences on the scope and nature of globalised health 
law and governance. Its universalist orientation also obscures the enduring influences of 
colonial and imperial forms on the relationship between the global north and other regions 
of the world. This paper proposes an alternative approach capable of accounting for these 
neglected dimensions. It argues that global health interventions are structured by a range 
of spatio-temporal figures (or ‘chronotopes’) which have persuasive force owing to their 
resonance with wider cultural and political forms. The potential of this approach is explored 
through a review of the 2010 United States initiative to support biosecurity at health 
research laboratories in East Africa. Led by (then) Senator Richard Lugar, this initiative 
responded to the perceived threat that unsecured pathogens could be seized and 
‘weaponised’ by international terrorist groups. The Senator and his high-ranking team 
aimed securing both laboratory improvements and the required bilateral funding from US 
authorities. Their arguments were crucially shaped by a combination of spatio-temporal 
figures including the idea of Africa as a natural source of disease, the ‘regression’ of states 
in the region to failed status, and the ineffectiveness of national borders given the rapid 
spread of pathogens. 
Keywords: biosecurity; chronotopes; global health; East Africa; nodal governance 
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“We Can’t Wait for the Bugs to Spread” 
Rhetorics of Time, Space and Biosecurity in Global Health Law  
Introduction 
Global health is overwhelmingly done in and to countries of the global south. But the 
concrete dynamics and historical context of this process are often neglected by legal 
scholars in favour of a functionalist and diffusionist model which sees it a largely abstract 
body of norms emerging from global ‘centres’, such as Washington or Geneva, in 
response to new disease threats and a lack of capacity at the ‘periphery’, say in Sierra 
Leone or southern China.2 The particularities of the global north and its historic 
relationship with other regions of the world are obscured behind universalist discourses 
of science, public health and human rights.3 By contrast a critical approach would seek to 
make visible what has been obscured. Drawing on work at the intersection of cultural 
studies, constructivist international relations scholarship and socio-legal studies it would 
foreground the political and rhetorical contingency of global health law. It would use 
these analytical resources to connect current interventions in the field with their colonial 
precursors and the commonsense assumptions that framed and justified them. Without 
lapsing into mere denunciation it would reflect on the imperial present and well as the 
imperial past of global health. The present paper seeks to meet this challenge. It argues 
that a critical and contextual reading of global health law is possible given the strategic 
and rhetorical nature of interventions in the field. The discussion takes as its focus a 
moment in the shaping of health law and governance in two African countries, Kenya and 
Uganda, by a combination of international and foreign, here US, norms.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section I critique briefly the 
universalist model of global health law which underpins the leading textbook on the 
subject. In its place I emphasize the dispersed and strategic nature of norm creation and 
implementation in global health. I propose a framework for studying this which combines 
insights regarding the heterogeneous and transnationalized nature of states in the global 
south, with the theory of nodal governance. I highlight the important role of persuasion 
within this framework: the imperative of convincing target nodes, such as funders in the 
global north and health institutions in the global south, of the need for specific governance 
measures. Successful persuasion is inevitably dependent on the successful use of 
appropriate cultural forms and the evocation of shared assumptions. In the rest of the 
paper I seek to specify this model by applying it to the efforts of a high-level US 
delegation which visited East Africa in late 2010.  Its purpose was to gain domestic 
support for biosecurity improvements at health research laboratories in the region in order 
to stop unsecured pathogens being seized and ‘weaponised’ by international terrorist 
groups.  
I argue that the visit was a ‘telling instance’ in the terms used by Peter Fitzpatrick: 
a situation ‘embedding a reiterative concern of the modern period’ marked by irresolution 
                                                 
2 This problematic is well captured in Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffe, ‘The Postcolonial Moment in 
Security Studies’ (2006) 32 Review of International Studies 329–352. 
3 Sara Hodges, ‘The Global Menace’ (2011) 25(3) Social History of Medicine 719-728, 721. 
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and demanding resolution.4 The chief concern regarded the potential for bioterrorists to 
overcome spatial distance and to collapse temporal difference between African territories 
and the states of the global north. Spatio-temporal irresolution, associated in the popular 
mind with globalization seeks a resolution through improved security and capacity 
building, not just in the global north, but at key sites in Africa. While there have been no 
such attacks in the period since the visit, the threat of bioterrorism remains a matter of 
considerable concern to arms control experts and anti-terrorist police in the US and 
Europe.5 The World Health Organization renewed its Global Biosecurity Agenda in 2014, 
likewise the G8 Global Partnership against the was extended Spread of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Taking the rhetorical nature of the delegation’s efforts seriously, allows us to 
understand the recent past, but also the present of global biosecurity efforts. ,  visiting 
delegation by grasping the variety of time-space figures, or ‘chronotopes’, resonant with 
US audiences which it used to dramatize the danger to American national security from 
under-funded and disorganized laboratories in Africa.  
 
 
Global Health and Nodal Governance 
Global health law has developed as a field of study and practice over the last fifteen years. 
Its coming of age was marked by publication of the first textbook on the subject in 2014 
written by Lawrence Gostin. He casts the significance of global health law in expansive 
moral and functional terms. It is underpinned, he argues, by a generous conception of 
global social justice which seeks a fair measure of health protection for each human being, 
including the reduction of in socio-economic disparities within and among countries.6 
The juridical nature of global health law is rather more restricted in Gostin’s account. He 
sees it, in essence, as a branch of public international law.7 This limits its subjects to 
sovereign states and its sources to treaties and official soft law measures either directly 
focussed on health or having a substantial impact on it. He is clear that this is limited 
range is unsatisfactory from an instrumental point of view. More effective governance 
will need to incorporate non-state actors and non-official standards and norms to its 
repertoire in addressing pressing health challenges.8  
  
Even with this admission Gostin’s analysis remains constrained however. In 
particular it pays relatively less attention to the crucial role played by national law in both 
the global south and north in realising health governance. This is a significant omission 
for three reasons. First, the normative output of international human rights and health 
agencies normally needs to be translated into constitutional provisions or domestic 
legislation to take effect in states. This contribution is not merely instrumental. National 
                                                 
4 Peter Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Grounds of Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2001) 4. 
5 For recent incident linked to the DAESH terror group, see ‘Police Carry out More Raids in Cologne 
Germany after Biological Weapon Arrest’, Homeland Security News Wire, 15th June 2018. The fatal use of 
the chemical weapon ‘Novichok’ in a British town in 2018 raises similar concerns. 
6 Lawrence O. Gostin, Global Health Law (Cambridge [Ma], Harvard University Press, 2014) 13ff. 
 
7 Lawrence O. Gostin, Global Health Law (Cambridge [Ma], Harvard University Press, 2014) 59. 
 
8 Lawrence O. Gostin, Global Health Law (Cambridge [Ma], Harvard University Press, 2014) 64. 
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law-making processes may be sites of adaptation and resistance depending on the relative 
strength of, say, local and foreign lobbyists and the legal and political conjuncture within 
a given country. Second, we are not only concerned with the nations of the global south 
in tracing the dimensions of global health governance. The legislative output, diplomatic 
initiatives and financial support of foreign donor states, whether through direct, bilateral 
or multilateral engagement, exercises a crucial influence on health-related norms and 
institutions elsewhere. Third, it is important to note the process of foreshortening involved 
when we speak of ‘nation states’, since the latter are inevitably aggregates of diverse 
ministries and agencies. This heterogeneity is especially evident in countries of the global 
south as a result of their dependence on external resources since the period of structural 
adjustment programmes and their successors.9 According to Boaventura de Sousa Santos 
these processes have meant that national bodies may be differentially ‘transnationalised’ 
with some being more closely tied to corresponding international and foreign institutions 
in terms of ‘political cultures and regulatory logics’ than to other parts of the domestic 
state.10 
 
The complex tangle of the international, the foreign and the national in global 
health law suggested by the foregoing discussion can be usefully mapped using the theory 
of nodal governance developed by Drahos, Burris and Shearing.11 On their reading, 
official institutions, as well as non-state actors, are ‘nodes’ which pursue governance 
outcomes by ‘enrolling’ other nodes and leveraging their powers to that end. The capacity 
of a given node to enrol others depends on: 1) its institutional structure; 2) the material 
resources available to it; 3) the technologies which it can use to exert influence, such as 
publicity, but also its formal legal powers and rights; and 4) its characteristic ‘mentality’, 
ie. how it understands problems and communicates the importance of solving them.12   
 
This model is useful to the project of developing a critical and contextual 
perspective on global health law in two ways. First, it captures the heterogeneous and 
dispersed nature of norm-creating and implementing powers in systems such as global 
health. Its ‘flat’ topology of nodes enrolling each other improves upon state-centric top-
down designs by accounting for the contribution of non-state bodies, acknowledged by 
Gostin, and their capacity to ‘govern’ state nodes.13 It also moves beyond the centre-
periphery model, discussed above, by reckoning in principle with diverse national 
institutions, both north and south, as authentic sources of global health governance. 
Moreover, it can help to account for the differential transnationalisation of the state by 
allowing us to track the direct connections between, for example, Kenyan research 
institutes and US public health agencies. Second, the emphasis placed by Drahos, Burris 
and Shearing on publicity, communication and the framing of problems, suggests that 
                                                 
9 Kanishka Jayasuriya, ‘Globalization, Law and the Transformation of Sovereignty: The Emergence of 
Global Regulatory Governance’ (1999) 6 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 425. 
 
10  Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘The Heterogenous State and Legal Pluralism in Mozambique’ (2006) 40 
Law and Society Review 39. 
 
11 Peter Drahos, Clifford D. Shearing and Scott Burris, ‘Nodal Governance’ (2005) 30 Australian Journal 
of Legal Philosophy 30. 
 
12 Peter Drahos, Clifford D. Shearing and Scott Burris, ‘Nodal Governance’ (2005) 30 Australian Journal 
of Legal Philosophy 30, 37-9. 
13 See Colin Scott, ‘Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A Neglected Facet of Contemporary 
Governance’ (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society, 56 -76. 
 5 
 
global health governance has an important discursive or rhetorical dimension.14 Nodes 
neither govern and nor are they enrolled solely by mechanical means, such as physical 
force or bribery, but also through plausible argument about law, science, policy and so 
on. What is plausible depends on the ‘regulatory logics’ of the particular nodes, but also 
on the on wider cultural assumptions, contemporary political contexts and historical 
trajectories of localised governance nodes.15  
 
The discursive effort of enrolment is realized through rhetorical forms and figures, 
of time and space for example, whose resonance with the mentalities of specific audiences 
goes to determine their effectiveness. Interventions in the related fields of pathogen 
security and infectious disease control, which are the concrete focus of this paper, are no 
exception. As will be seen, nationally inflected conceptions of security and vulnerability, 
of development and regression, provide an important orientation for enrolment strategies 
directed at key nodes in both the global north and the global south. These conceptions 
and the mode of their articulation are no recent invention. Rather they draw on a long 
established cultural repertoire for representing the people, the states and the very terrain 
of Africa as a threat to Europe and its settler colonies.  
 
 
 
 
Arms Control, Biological Weapons and Health 
 
Global health law in countries of the global south is shaped, as I have noted, not only by 
international legal regimes, but also by the output of foreign legislatures, courts and 
executive bodies. European and North American institutions exert a crucial influence 
directly through funding and advising national ministries and other institutions, but also 
indirectly through their ability to leverage the normative output of multilateral bodies, 
such as the WHO.16 This specific mode of governance was evidenced by the visit to East 
Africa in late 2010 of a delegation led by Senator Richard Lugar under the auspices of 
the US Department of Defense Co-operative Threat Reduction Programme.17 Established 
in 1991 the CTRP originally worked with states in the territories of the former Soviet 
Union to secure and dismantle weapon stockpiles inherited from the Cold War period.18 
Its extension to East Africa was motivated, as one of the delegation put it, by an urgent 
                                                 
14 See also John Harrington, Towards a Rhetoric of Medical Law (Routledge, London 2017). 
 
15 John Harrington and Alasdair O’Hare, ‘Framing the National Interest. Debating Intellectual Property and 
Access to Medicines in Kenya’ (2014) 17 Journal of World Intellectual Property 16-33. 
 
16 For a study of how strong intellectual property rights were globalized in this way, notwithstanding 
concerns about their effect on access to essential medicines, see Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite, Who 
Owns the Knowledge Economy? Political Organizing Behind TRIPS (Sturminster Newton, Corner House, 
2004). 
 
17  The programme is commonly named ‘Nunn-Lugar’ after its co-founders, Senator Lugar and Senator 
Sam Nunn. 
18 John Felton, The Nunn-Lugar Vision (Washington DC, Nuclear Threat Initiative 2002). 
 6 
 
concern with the likely nexus in that region between non-state terror groups, ‘ungoverned 
spaces, and human and animal health laboratories working on endemic diseases, some of 
which are rare and exotic’.19 Accompanied by senior officials from the Department of 
Defense,20 the delegation visited the Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI) 
headquarters in Nairobi and the Uganda Virus Research Institute (UVRI) in Entebbe 
inspecting facilities, paying particular attention to laboratory security and storage, and 
discussing resource needs with senior staff. The immediate objective of the trip was to 
move Congress to fund improvements at these laboratories in accordance with 
international standards and, thus, contribute to reducing the threat of biological weapons 
proliferation.21 In later sections I will examine the rhetorical dimensions of Senator 
Lugar’s intervention. Before that however, I wish to set out the background to the visit 
across three dimensions: 1) the changing multilateral arms control environment as regards 
biological weapons; 2) bilateral initiatives of the United States to promote biosecurity 
measures at key Kenyan health nodes; and 3) Lugar’s efforts to enrol US state nodes 
capable of funding these measures. 
 
 
The Multilateral Environment 
Senator Lugar’s visit manifested a broader shift in the US approach to biological weapons 
after the end of the Cold War. This followed on the perceived failure of government-
focussed multilateral measures to address the threat of proliferation.22 Concerns had 
increased with the exposure of the Soviet Union’s secret biological weapons programme 
in 1991, the use of such weapons by Iraq against its Kurdish population in 1988 and 
isolated incidents where non-state actors attempted to use biological and chemical 
weapons, most notably the 1995 sarin gas attack by the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo.23 
The anthrax attacks on US government facilities, which followed shortly on the atrocities 
of September 11th 2001, gave these efforts further urgency. A ‘biodefense boom’ in 
spending on research and development was accompanied by new legislation to intensify 
regulation of the holding, use and transfer of dangerous pathogens, including laboratory 
safety and security standards backed up by criminal sanctions.24 Most of these measures 
were domestically focussed, however, with relatively less attention being paid to 
                                                 
19 Andrew C Weber, quoted in Mike Pflanz, ‘Why Senator Lugar is Worried about Bioterrorism in East 
Africa’, Christian Science Monitor, 12 November 2010. 
20 Notably Andrew C Weber, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense 
Programs, Ken Handelmann, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Ken Myers II Director of the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency. 
 
21 It is important to distinguish in this context between ‘biosecurity’, which concerns the unauthorized or 
malicious misappropriation of dangerous biological agents from laboratories, and ‘biosafety’, which relates 
to the safety of laboratory workers themselves, see Christian Enemark, Biosecurity Dilemmas. Dreaded 
Diseases, Ethical Responses, and the Health of Nations (Washington DC, Georgetown University Press 
2017) 51. 
22 Alexander Kelle, ‘Securitization of International Public Health: Implications for Global Health 
Governance and the Biological Weapons Prohibition Regime’ (2007) 13 Global Governance 217-235. 
23 Christian Enemark, Disease and Security. Natural Plagues and Biological Weapons in East Asia 
(London, Routledge 2007) 107-110. 
 
24 Christian Enemark, Biosecurity Dilemmas. Dreaded Diseases, Ethical Responses, and the Health of 
Nations (Washington DC, Georgetown University Press 2017) 27; Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness Act 2002. 
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prevention abroad.25  
 
At the international level the US had previously looked to the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention (1972) (BWC) which prohibits states parties from 
developing or using such weapons and from assisting other states to obtain or 
manufacture the necessary toxins or agents to do so (Article 3). However, the Convention 
suffers from two key deficiencies in the eyes of US policy makers.26 First it focusses 
primarily on the actions of states rather than those of non-state actors. Second it lacks a 
legally binding mechanism to ensure compliance. The US pulled out of extended 
negotiations to create a binding inspections regime for the BWC in 2001, President 
George W Bush fearing that it would fail to catch non-state ‘bioweaponeers’, while being 
unable to keep up with scientific developments.27 By 2007 Fidler and Gostin were able 
to argue that ‘continued reliance on the BWC … as a strategy for governing the problem 
of bioweapons is dead’.28 
 
Alongside the BWC, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 of 2004 (UNSCR 
1540) obligates all UN member states inter alia to establish domestic controls for 
preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, including 
criminalisation and enforcement provisions, and to report these to a dedicated UN 
committee. However, it too lacks an enforcement mechanism and in the period before 
Lugar’s visit to East Africa US arms control experts had expressed concern about 
incomplete implementation of UNSR 1540 and inadequate reporting to its monitoring 
committee by states in the region.29  
 
The US had also pursued its non-proliferation objectives through the WHO, 
seeking to influence the terms of its International Health Regulations (IHR), under 
revision from 1995 to 2005. The old Regulations only required states to notify the WHO 
of infectious outbreaks in the case of six listed diseases.30 In order to deal more effectively 
with novel threats, the list was replaced by a decision-matrix centred on the more open-
                                                 
25 A total of US$40 billion was spent across federal departments and agencies on all measures addressed to 
the threat of biological weapons, such as research and development, between 2001-8. But in 2008 only 2% 
was dedicated to prevention at home or abroad: Barry Kellman, Biological Terrorism: US Policies to 
Reduce Global Biothreats (Washington DC, Partnership for a Secure America 2008) 23. 
26 David P. Fidler and Lawrence O. Gostin, Biosecurity in the Global Age Biological Weapons, Public 
Health, and the Rule of Law (Stanford [Ca], Stanford UP 2007) 49-53. 
27 Judi Sture, Simon Whitby and Dana Perkins, ‘Biosafety, Biosecurity and Internationally Mandated 
Regulatory Regimes: Compliance Mechanisms for Education and Global Health Security’ (2013) 29(4) 
Medicine, Conflict and Survival 289-232; Colin McInnes and Kelley Lee, ‘Health, Security and Foreign 
Policy’ (2006) 32 Review of International Studies 5–23. 
28 David P. Fidler and Lawrence O. Gostin, Biosecurity in the Global Age Biological Weapons, Public 
Health, and the Rule of Law (Stanford [Ca], Stanford UP 2007) 59. 
29 Brian Finlay, Johan Bergenas, and Veronica Tessler, Beyond Boundaries in Eastern Africa: Bridging the 
Security/ Development Divide With International Security Assistance (Washington DC, The Stimson 
Center and the Stanley Foundation 2011) 26 , 30 = 
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/report/EArpt311.pdf 
30 See Lorna Weir and Eric Mykhalovskiy, Global Public Health Vigilance. Creating a World on Alert 
(London, Routledge 2010) 108ff. 
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ended concept of ‘public health emergencies of international concern’.31 The US argued 
that deliberately caused epidemics, including those caused by bioweapons, should be 
expressly included for notification within this matrix, allowing the WHO to gather 
information relevant to security as well as health. However, these attempts failed due to 
the resistance of countries in the global south, led by Pakistan and Iran.32 
US approaches to biological weapons proliferation from the 1990s were thus 
marked by a widening of the range of actors targeted and the modes of governance 
deployed. This shift was accompanied by an extension of thematic focus from traditional 
arms control to other sectors, particularly public health and the health sciences. 
International relations scholars and scientific experts argued that, given the nature of 
pathogens and how they spread, bioterrorist incidents would be more like natural disease 
outbreaks than conventional or nuclear attacks.33 Planning and response measures could 
thus be assimilated to (improved) infectious disease control strategies. Equally the 
infrastructure of medical research was itself a crucial site for non-proliferation efforts, 
given the potential for loss or theft of pathogens themselves and for bona fide research 
findings to be used for malign purposes.34 This thematic widening was supported by a 
convincing case that the norms established in the BWC, UNSCR 1540 and the IHR all 
extend to scientific research.35 Review Conferences of the BWC have affirmed the 
importance of national legal measures in this regard and the WHO has promulgated non-
binding guidance on laboratory biosecurity.36 However, to reiterate, the shortcomings of 
these largely state-focussed, multilateral regimes as regards enforcement meant that US 
ambitions for global biosecurity could only be realized by a more direct, bilateral 
enrolment of scientific institutions in other countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 For a discussion of the Regulations as adopted, see David P Fidler and Lawrence O Gostin, ‘The New 
International Health Regulations: An Historic Development for International Law and Public Health’, 34(1) 
Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 85–94 (2006). 
32 Alexander Kelle, ‘Securitization of International Public Health: Implications for Global Health 
Governance and the Biological Weapons Prohibition Regime’ (2007) 13 Global Governance 217-235, 227. 
33 See the discussion by the author himself, and the quotation from David Heyman of the WHO, in Christian 
Enemark, Disease and Security. Natural Plagues and Biological Weapons in East Asia (London, Routledge 
2007) 73. 
34 David P. Fidler and Lawrence O. Gostin, Biosecurity in the Global Age Biological Weapons, Public 
Health, and the Rule of Law (Stanford [Ca], Stanford UP 200) 67-87.  
35 Judi Sture, Simon Whitby and Dana Perkins, ‘Biosafety, Biosecurity and Internationally Mandated 
Regulatory Regimes: Compliance Mechanisms for Education and Global Health Security’ (2013) 29(4) 
Medicine, Conflict and Survival 289-232. 
36 Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction GE.12-60060 Geneva, 5–22 December 2011 BWC /CONF.VII/7 p.11; WHO, Risk 
Management: Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance (October 2006) WHO/CDS/EPR/2006.6.  
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Enrolling East African Nodes 
  
The US engagement with individual states and their scientists was not intended to replace 
multilateral biological weapons control systems. Rather it sought to leverage them by 
deploying its preponderant material resources and scientific capacity to shape the 
infrastructure and normative environment of medical research facilities in the global 
south. A good example of this ‘full spectrum science and technology collaboration’ is 
provided by the proposed Global Pathogen Surveillance Act, drafted in consultation with 
the US Department of Defense and the WHO.37 It was introduced by Senator Lugar in 
2002 and passed by the Senate in 2005. The Act would have earmarked funds of over 
$150 million to support technical assistance to laboratories in the global south and created 
a programme for relevant staff to train in the United States or locally under the direction 
of US Centres for Disease Control and Department of Defense units. In return it laid down 
pre-requisites for the receipt of aid, most importantly duties to participate in US disease 
surveillance networks, to implement the IHRs and to comply with obligations under the 
BWC.  
 
Even though the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act ultimately failed to pass the 
House of Representatives, its purposes were the same as those of the Co-operative Threat 
Reduction Programme and of Senator Lugar and his team during their visit to East Africa 
in 2010. As we will see in later sections, its proponents drew on the same stock of spatio-
temporal figures regarding the threat posed by Africa, its people and its laboratories to 
global and especially American biosecurity. In any case the Act, to a significant degree, 
would have formalised already existing collaboration in matters of health security and 
medical research with countries in the global south. In Kenya, for example, KEMRI has 
long depended on substantial foreign support and co-operation, including that of US 
public health and defence institutions.38 It works closely and shares facilities with the 
Centers for Disease Control and the US Army Medical Research Unit.39 These links form 
part of a much broader US involvement in and financial contribution to Kenya’s public 
health system.40 They are nested furthermore within a close strategic military relationship 
between the two countries dating back to the Cold War period.41 In addition scarcity of 
                                                 
37 See Barry Kellman, Biological Terrorism: US Policies to Reduce Global Biothreats (Washington DC, 
Partnership for a Secure America 2008) 11 
.  
38 Cheryl Pellerin, ‘New Defense Department Command Targets Health Issues’, AFNWS, 21st October 
2008. 
 
39 Statement of Dr. David Tornberg, MD, MPH Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to 
House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Hearing on 
Homeland Security: Improving Public Health Surveillance, 5th May 2003; ‘US Army Medical Unit in 
Kenya Stands Ready’, States News Service, 22nd June 2009. 
40 For example, in 2016 the US the President’s Emergency Fund for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), supplied 64% 
of Kenya’s total expenditure in response to the HIV/ AIDS epidemic, with only 21% coming from the 
national government:  Health Policy Project, Health Financing Profile. Kenya. May (Washington DC, 
USAID 2016). 
 
41 Kenya remains one of the largest recipients of US military and law enforcement assistance in Sub-
Saharan Africa, see Lauren Ploch, Countering Terrorism in East Africa:  The U.S. Response (Washington 
DC, Congressional Research Service 2010) 50-51. 
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local resources for health means that the promise of material support is a highly effective 
means for US nodes, such as the CTRP, to mobilise Kenyan counterparts. During Lugar’s 
visit KEMRI director, Dr Solomon Mpoke noted, for example, that the incineration and 
storage facilities in Nairobi had been built 42 years previously ‘without consideration for 
biosafety’ and as a result were now ‘overwhelmed’.42  
 
Beyond meeting material needs, successful enrolment also depends, as I 
suggested in section 2 above, on appealing to and developing shared problem-solving 
‘mentalities’ at the target node. In response to the perceived failure of multilateral 
approaches to bioweapons control, discussed above, initiatives like the Global Pathogen 
Surveillance Act and Co-operative Threat Reduction Programme sought to enrol 
individual scientists and laboratory directors to the cause of biosecurity by promoting 
detailed technical standards and ethical codes of conduct.43 For example, a workshop on 
these questions held in Nairobi some months before Senator Lugar’s visit brought 
together US government and military officials and the staff of international organisations 
with representatives of 19 African countries.44 The latter provided updates on their 
countries’ implementation of UNSCR 1540 and in return received one-on-one 
consultations regarding issues from legal regulation to the equipment and routines 
necessary to secure laboratory environments.  US officials explicitly highlighted that 
effective and efficient laboratory practices were obligated by the Resolution, but they also 
strove to promote a ‘culture of increased accountability and compliance’.45  
 
 
 
Enrolling US Nodes 
 
While laboratories at KEMRI and elsewhere in East Africa were the ultimate object of 
Senator Lugar’s concern, the primary audiences for his report and conclusions were 
American. In particular, Congress would have to vote in favour of allocating specific 
funds for strengthening laboratory security in East Africa within the budget for the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme. This was no automatic process. The case for 
significant investment had to be made notwithstanding the fact that, at the time of the 
visit, only 5 people worldwide had been killed with biological agents taken from a 
                                                 
42 Mike Pflanz, ‘Why Senator Lugar is Worried about Bioterrorism in East Africa’, Christian Science 
Monitor, 12 November 2010. A subsequent review of capacity to implement the IHRs which scored Kenya 
at only 65% on indicators such as the implementation of biosafety and biosecurity practices: World Health 
Organization, Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005) Report by the Director-
General, Executive Board EB132/15, 132nd Session, 21st December 2012. 
43 Ronnie Faircloth, ‘Nunn-Lugar Global Cooperation’ (2009) 2(4) DTRA Basic and Applied Research 
Program Newsletter 1. 
44 Diana Berardocco, ‘New Approaches to Global Security. Engagement Aims to Reduce Threats’,  US 
Africa Command Blog , 8th April 2010 =  https://africom.wordpress.com/tag/nunn-lugar-global-
cooperation-nlgc/  
 
45 Diana Berardocco, ‘New Approaches to Global Security. Engagement Aims to Reduce Threats’,  US 
Africa Command Blog , 8th April 2010 (emphasis added) =  https://africom.wordpress.com/tag/nunn-lugar-
global-cooperation-nlgc/ 
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laboratory, whereas millions of lives had been lost in the HIV/AIDS pandemic.46 
Academic commentators, like McInnes and Lee, argued that the growing focus on 
bioterrorism represented the triumph of selfish, northern-centric perspectives in global 
health.47 Even within the specific context of arms control, experts pointed out that 
laboratory biosecurity only offered limited protection against weaponisation, since most 
of the pathogens were available in nature anyway.48 Resources might be more effectively 
dedicated, it was argued, to systems for disease surveillance, treatment and response 
extending well beyond the laboratory.49 Where terrorists did obtain pathogens from 
unsecured laboratories, they would normally lack the scientific know-how to weaponise 
this material and would expose themselves to considerable risk in trying to do so.50  
 
 
 
 
‘Using their Imagination’: Cultural Dimensions of Enrolment 
 
 
 
Since there was ‘no actionable intelligence’, much less a clear example of bioterrorist 
action, Lugar was required on his own admission to help US audiences ‘to use their 
imagination’ in order to justify the provision of material support for East African 
laboratories.51 In studying this rhetorical effort we reconnect with insights from nodal 
governance theory concerning the cultural and situated nature of enrolment, discussed 
above. Warrant for a culturally-informed approach in the specific context of biosecurity 
is provided by work in security studies and international relations. By ‘scaremongering 
abroad for the sake of political gain at home’, as one critic put it,52 Lugar was seeking to 
‘securitize’ laboratory facilities procedures in East Africa. Such ‘securitization’, 
according to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, is achieved through a ‘speech act’ designating 
                                                 
46 Thus, Milton Leitenberg, senior research scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at 
the University of Maryland, quoted in Jason Strazusio, ‘US Team on Africa Bioterror Prevention Tour to 
Study Ways to Stop Future Attacks’, Associated Press, 12th November 2010. 
47 Colin McInnes and Kelley Lee, ‘Health, Security and Foreign Policy’ (2006) 32 Review of International 
Studies 5–23, 15. 
48 In this respect it was argued that a false analogy had been drawn with nuclear weapons, where the relevant 
material does not exist outside the laboratory: Marc L Ostfield, ‘Pathogen Security: the Illusion of Security 
in Foreign Policy and Biodefence’ (2009) 12 International Journal of Risk Assessment and Management 
204-221, 209.  
49 Gregory Koblentz, ‘Biosecurity Reconsidered: Calibrating Biological Threats and Responses’, (2010) 
34(4) International Security 96-132. 
50 See the comments of Noel Stott, South African Institute for Strategic Studies, quoted in Jason Strazusio, 
‘US Team on Africa Bioterror Prevention Tour to Study Ways to Stop Future Attacks’, Associated Press, 
12th November 2010.  
 
51 Emeka Gekara-Mayaka, ‘US wants Top Security for Kenya’s Germ Labs’ Daily Nation 12th November 
2010; Mike Pflanz, ‘Why Senator Lugar is Worried about Bioterrorism in East Africa’, Christian Science 
Monitor, 12th November 2010.  
 
52 Anonymous quoted in ‘A Bug's Life: How Safe are Health Laboratories in Developing Countries?’ The 
Economist, 6th January 2011. 
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an existential threat to the state which entails certain emergency measures.53 While this 
model properly emphasizes the performative nature of securitization, it has been criticized 
for limiting itself to the  abstract and rule-bound form of speech acts.54 Rather, as Balzacq 
has argued, such interventions are locally situated and open-textured discursively.55 
Instead of simply doing securitization by speaking, they seek to persuade concrete 
audiences at a given historical moment of the nature of the threat and the necessity for 
urgent action.56 In our case Senator Lugar does more than incant an established form of 
words in the manner of a religious rite or a standard form contract. Rather, in the manner 
identified by  Jutta Weldes, he conjures up the US national interest in global health and 
dramatizes the threat posed to it by putative bioterrorists, drawing on a dense array of 
historically informed, ‘cultural, linguistic and institutional resources’.57 In doing so he 
creates and confirms the identity of his domestic readership and of the American state 
itself.58 A critical reading of  global health requires us to identify the ‘cultural raw 
materials’ out of which such cases are made, paying careful attention to rhetorical forms 
and figures used, and widening our critical repertoire beyond speech and text, to include 
images, symbols and tangible forms.59  
 
 
The range of relevant rhetorical figures which could be considered in such a 
critical study is great. But, for purposes of this discussion, I wish to focus on images of 
time and space, particularly in combination. Brief reflection suggests that key problems 
in global biosecurity and in global health are commonly articulated in these terms: the 
‘re-emergence’ of certain infectious diseases in Africa, the spread of contagion from 
global south to north, the increased risk of such spread posed by accelerating trade and 
international travel, the demand for real-time notification of disease outbreaks and so on. 
Critical scholars have examined the spatial and temporal aspects of these discursive 
                                                 
53 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder [CO], 
Lynne Rienne 1998). 
 
54 Michael C. Williams, ‘Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics’ (2003) 47(4) 
International Studies Quarterly 511-553, 526. 
 
55 Thierry Balzacq, ‘The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context’ (2005) 
11(2) European Journal of International Relations 171-201. 
56 That is, they have ‘perlocutionary’ as much ‘illocutionary’ effects. This distinction and the notion of 
speech acts more generally is taken from John L. Austin, How to do Things with Words (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 1962).   
57 Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests. The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(Minneapolis [Mn], Minnesota University Press 1999) 12. 
 
58 David Campbell, Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis 
[Mn], University of Minnesota Press 1992) 13; Scott Watson, ‘Back Home, Safe and Sound: The Public 
and Private Production of Insecurity’ (2011) 5 International Political Sociology 160–177, 161. 
59 Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests. The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(Minneapolis [Mn], Minnesota University Press 1999) 13, 110; Michael C. Williams, ‘Words, Images, 
Enemies: Securitization and International Politics’ (2003) 47(4) International Studies Quarterly 511-553, 
524. 
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phenomena separately.60 Less attention has been paid to their interrelated nature.61 The 
rhetorical potential of such ‘chronotopes’, and the need for critical scholars to attend to 
them, was first suggested by the Russian critic Mikhail Bakhtin.62 Chronotopes, such as 
the ‘threshold’ and the ‘passage’, are pervasive in literature and popular culture. They 
attest to the fact that time is inevitably represented in space (eg. the crossing of the 
physical threshold as the passage from one phase of life to another) and space is produced 
through time (eg. the transportation of slaves across the ocean to America).63 Each 
contributes to the aesthetic appeal and moral force of texts, helping to identify them with 
specific genres (eg. nostalgic ‘storyscapes’ of childhood in modern African fiction).64 
Social practices too can also be grasped as chronotopes whose moral significance is 
articulated through their aesthetic form. The queue outside a polling station moving 
slowly in space and time, for example, may be understood alternatively as an emblem of 
democratic transformation or chronic maladministration.65 As this example suggests, 
chronotopes are not simply products of imagination. They emerge from an iterative 
reaction of cultural ideals on physical forms and vice versa.66  
 
Chronotopes are pervasive in law too, as Mariana Valverde has recently shown.67  
Legal doctrine creates its own spatio-temporal figures, for example, the standard lease 
over defined property for a fixed term.68 Equally developments in law are shaped by 
social chronotopes, such as the ‘family home’ passing down the generations. As in 
literature, the value of legal and social chronotopes comes from their formal and 
substantive appeal to readers and audiences. The ‘family home’ is a neat, bounded and 
graspable figure, well anchored in the wider culture. A judicial decision in its defence 
will be plausible to that extent. Chronotopes, thus, contribute to the persuasiveness of 
                                                 
60 Leading examples include: Nicholas B. King, ‘Security, Disease, Commerce: Ideologies of Postcolonial 
Global Health’ (2002) 32(5/6) Social Studies of Science 763-778; and Melinda Cooper, ‘Pre-empting 
Emergence. The Biological Turn in the War on Terror’ (2006) 23(4) Theory, Culture and Society 113–135. 
 
61 For an insightful exception, see David Reubi, ‘Temporal and Spatial Imaginaries of Global Health. 
Tobacco, Non-Communicable Diseases and Modernity’, in Clare Herrick and David Reubi (eds), Global 
Health and Geographical Imaginaries (London, Routledge 2017) 22-35. 
 
62  Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays (Austin [Tx]: University of Texas Press 1996) 84. 
 
63 Esther Peeren, ‘Through the Lens of the Chronotope: Suggestions for a Spatio-Temporal Perspective on 
Diaspora’ (2006) 13 Thamyris/ Intersecting 67-78, 69. Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and 
Double-Consciousness (Cambridge [Ma], Harvard University Press 1993) 4. 
 
64 Christopher EW Ouma, ‘”Countries of the Mind” – Space-Time Chronotopes in Adichie’s Purple 
Hibiscus’, in Ogaga Ougade (ed) Tradition and Change in Contemporary West and East African Fiction: 
Matatu 45 (Amsterdam, New York, Rodopi 2014) 167-185. 
65 Joe Moran, ‘Queueing Up in Postwar Britain’ (2005) 16 Twentieth Century British History 283. 
 
66 State borders, identified on maps and achieved through fences ‘on the ground’ are one example: Ian 
Klinke, ‘Chronopolitics a Conceptual Matrix’ (2012) 37 Progress in Human Geography 673-690, 674. 
67 Mariana Valverde, Chronotopes of Law: Jurisdiction, Scale and Governance (Routledge, London 2015). 
68 The examples in this paragraph are taken from Mariana Valverde, Chronotopes of Law: Jurisdiction, 
Scale and Governance (Routledge, London 2015) 169ff. 
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arguments in and about law, not only in domestic legal systems, but also in the case of 
global law, including global health law. In particular, the model of nodal governance 
outlined above suggests that culturally specific spatio-temporal figures are a significant 
feature of rhetorical enrolment strategies in international, as well as national fora. They 
provide ‘an ideological index’ helping to locate texts and other interventions with 
reference to historical influences and contemporary asymmetries of power.69 In this 
respect, however, it is important to note, along with Bakhtin, that chronotopes are plural.70 
They are articulated (in both senses of the word) contingently in any given speech with 
greater or less persuasive effects. They cannot be reduced one to the other. There is no 
master chronotope for an era or a mode of governance which somehow expresses a pre-
determined economic or political base. 
 
The following and penultimate section of this paper develops a chronotopical 
analysis of Senator Lugar’s 2010 visit to East Africa, as a notable moment in the 
realization of global health governance through bilateral north-south engagement. This is 
pursued by way of a close reading of the official report, along with contemporaneous 
newspaper articles. The substantive and explanatory text for the Global Pathogen 
Surveillance Act, proposed, but not passed by the US Congress, is also considered. This 
analysis picks out a number of resonant spatio-temporal figures which shaped the case 
made by Lugar and his high-level team for the material support of laboratories like those 
visited in Uganda and Kenya. While the separate dimensions of each – ie. time and space 
- are specified, it will be seen that much of their rhetorical power derives from their 
mutually reinforcing nature. The distinctiveness of each chronotope will be taken 
seriously in other words. In each case I probe the resonances of the given figure, pointing 
to parallels and overlooked contexts in the post-war US history and in European 
representations of African contagion and lawlessness. In this respect I move beyond 
Bakhtin, who identifies specific chronotopes with distinct phases in literature. I argue 
instead that, in legal and policy debates, chrontopes are both plural and informed by 
historic spatio-temporal figures. Drawing on Valverde I augment this integrated analysis 
by attending to the additional, affective dimension of chronotopes. Figures, such as the 
‘family home’ or the ‘national territory’, she argues, call forth a distinctive ‘governance 
moods’ (eg. nostalgia, pride, anxiety) which inform and justify specific jurisdictional 
strategies.71 Thus, as Stern has shown, policies of preparedness in anticipation of 
bioterrorism, the intentional spread of pathogens over time and across space, are suffused 
with dread.72 The evocation of governance moods through the elaboration of specific 
chronotopes corresponds to the production of feeling, or ‘pathos’, in classical rhetoric.  
As such it contributes to the persuasiveness of interventions for global health and 
biosecurity.  
                                                 
69 Alexander Ganser, Juta Pühringer and Markus Rheindorf, ‘Bakhtin’s Chronotope on the Road. Space, 
Time and Place in Road Movies since the 1970s’ (2006) 4(1) Facta Universitatis: Linguistics and 
Literature 1-17, 2. 
70 Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays (Austin [Tx]: University of Texas Press 1996) 
150. 
71 Mariana Valverde, Chronotopes of Law: Jurisdiction, Scale and Governance (Routledge, London 2015) 
78. 
72 Jessica Stern, ‘Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons’ (2002-2003) 27(3) International 
Security 89-123.  
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The Senator Comes to East Africa: Chronotopes of Biosecurity 
 
 
The Inspection Tour 
 
Lugar’s visit itself, proceeding from Kenya, to Uganda and on to Burundi, is 
presented through the chronotope of the investigatory tour. Moving along the periphery, 
the inspector observes potential threats and the strength of defences, the ramparts at the 
edge of empire, as it were. He reports back to authorities at the centre on how things really 
are and what should be done about them. The opening section of a contemporaneous New 
York Times piece on the trip, quoted in the official report, participates in this mode of 
mobile observation. It has a filmic quality which calls Lugar into being as the 
investigating subject and us, as audience, moving with him: 
The laboratories of Uganda's Ministry of Agriculture, Animals, Industry and 
Fisheries sit on the top of a quiet hill on a turnoff near the airport, behind an 
eroded fence. At the end of a hallway is a room with an unlocked refrigerator. 
That is where the anthrax is kept.73 
Images in the report sustain this mode of visibility.74 The Senator peers at unidentified 
bacteria through a microscope in KEMRI Nairobi. He gazes over the fence that surrounds 
the facility. He stands looking at a pile of decommissioned explosives in Burundi.75 
Usually he is flanked by unnamed East African scientists and officials. They are formally 
dressed, in suits or lab coats, while the Senator and fellow team members appear 
workman-like in casual wear.  
 
Peripatetic observation discharges a governmental function, aiming to keep the 
edge under control by the centre. The reality of the latter is evoked by the physical 
presence of the investigator. The atmosphere is one of sober recording. This chronotope 
also recalls colonial expeditions, aimed at mapping the landscape of the African interior 
and the disease threats it contained. Latterly it is evident in the circulation of foreign 
observers through East African countries at election time and also in the visits of officials 
monitoring national compliance with the prescriptions of the international financial 
institutions. This involves not merely mechanical control through conditionalities 
imposed on aid and debt-relief, but also the fostering of governance mentalities in key 
nodes, such as the finance ministry or central bank, allowing self-discipline consistent 
                                                 
73 Josh Kron, ‘Uganda Seen as a Front Line in the Bioterrorism Fight’, New York Times, 11th November 
2010.  
74 Anon, ‘Countering More Threats, Faster’, Nunn-Lugar Global. The Africa Mission, November 2010, 1-
5, passim [copy on file with author]. References in brackets in the text are to pages in this report. 
75 Senator Lugar also visited Burundi on his trip, but only concerned himself there with conventional arms 
control. 
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with global financial orthodoxy.76 Lugar’s inspection visit to the laboratories of East 
Africa partakes of this mode.  
 
 
The Continent and the Petri-Dish 
 
Within the text of Lugar’s report itself the first identifiable chronotope evoked is that of 
Africa as a natural source of infectious diseases. The spatial dimension of this chronotope 
is defined by the limits of the continent itself, which is repeatedly referred to as such, 
notwithstanding that the investigation was limited to Kenya and Uganda. The land of 
Africa itself is the source of the threat: pathogens ‘originate on African soil’, pandemics 
‘emanate from there’ and ‘lethal disease’ is naturally prevalent ‘in African nations’ (5, 
1). The temporal mode of this chronotope is the eternal, as evidenced by the use of the 
present continuous in the text. Temporal and spatial dimensions reinforce each other. The 
continent is identified with a pre-social, unchanging nature outside of history. Its 
biological resources are open, available for appropriation and use by outside malefactors 
as well as benevolent explorers.77 During the cold war, Lugar notes that ‘the Soviets 
obtained many samples [there which they] used for biological weapons’ (1). The force of 
the threat is augmented by the specifics of climate. Reporters following the Senator’s trip 
described Uganda as ‘warm, wet and on the Equator’; its laboratories located in ‘a warm 
sleepy city’.78 Africa was described in microcosmic fashion as ‘a natural petri dish for 
some of the most deadly diseases on the planet’ (1).  
 
This chronotope of Africa as an unchanging and self-contained incubator of 
disease forms part of a wider imaginative geography which David Arnold has labelled 
‘tropicality’.79 For scientists, geographers and explorers, from the colonial period 
onwards, to call  
a part of the globe the tropics [was] a western way of defining something 
environmentally and culturally distinct from Europe while also perceiving a high 
degree of common identity between the constituent regions of this tropical world.80  
The tropical other could be fixed positively as an Edenic zone of exuberant fertility, but 
it was as likely to be denominated negatively.81 The temporal dimension here is one of 
                                                 
76 See Celine Tan, Governance through Development. Poverty Reduction Strategies, International Law and 
the Disciplining of World States (London, Routledge 2011). 
 
77 Abena Dove Osseo-Asare, Bitter Roots. The Search for Healing Plants in Africa (Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press 2014) 109. 
78 Josh Kron, ‘Uganda Seen as a Front Line in the Bioterrorism Fight’, New York Times, 11th November 
2010.  
79 See generally, David Arnold, The Problem of Nature. Environment, Culture and European Expansion 
(Oxford, Blackwell 1996). 
80 Felix Driver and Brenda SA Yeoh, ‘Constructing the Tropics. An Introduction’ (2000) 21(1) Singapore 
Journal of Tropical Geography 1-5, 1. 
81 See the discussion of 20th century French geographer Pierre Gourou in David Arnold, ‘”Illusory Riches”. 
Representations of the Tropical World 1840-1950’ (2000) 21(1) Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 
6-18. 
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timelessness, stasis, Africa outside of history in Hegel’s notorious formulation.82 Imperial 
theorists of racial hierarchy, thus, claimed that over-abundance removed the necessity for 
indigenous peoples to labour, innovate or delineate individual property holdings. This left 
Africa and equivalent regions stuck in the ‘childhood of man’, unable to develop the level 
of order and productivity which, it was claimed, marked the world’s temperate zones.83 
19th century pioneers of international public health too argued that the tropics were 
inevitably pestilential, their climate and geography generating poverty and disease in and 
of themselves.84 Negative tropicality underpinned isolationist and segregationist 
infectious disease control strategies, both as between African colonies and the European 
metropoles, and within colonies themselves, as between settlers and the indigenous 
population.85 Though long augmented and partly eclipsed by other governance 
discourses, particularly developmentalism, the chronotope of the tropics continues to 
function as a rhetorical resource for global health interventions, for instance during more 
recent outbreaks of ebola and zika (named respectively after locations in Zaire and 
Uganda).86 If the jurisdictional move licensed by tropicality is one of separation, the 
related governance mood is one of fatalism about the possibility of ever overcoming the 
problems posed by the continent’s inherent nature.87 
 
 
 
The Slum and the Failed State 
The threat posed by Africa as a whole was crystallized in the report by the fact that the 
laboratories visited were contiguous to lawless spaces, charactized by an uncontrolled 
mobility, both locally and regionally. Most proximately, it was noted that ‘squatters live 
in abandoned buildings on the grounds’ of one of the Ugandan laboratories with their 
broken windows and ripped fences (4). KEMRI in Nairobi is bordered by the massive 
Kibera slum, ‘a barely policed square mile of tin-roofed shacks’ some built ‘literally up 
against the wall of the lab’ where the Al-Shabaab terrorist group ‘was known to recruit’ 
(5). It had also been the site of massive civil conflict in the aftermath of Kenya’s disputed 
                                                 
82 Georg WF Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History (New York [NY], Dover 1956). This notion was 
reiterated by the French President Nicholas Sarkozy in a speech in Dakar 2007, for a summary and criticism, 
see MAR Habib, Hegel and Empire. From Postcolonialism to Globalism (London, Palgrave 2017) 49-64. 
83 Felix Driver and Brenda SA Yeoh, ‘Constructing the Tropics. An Introduction’ (2000) 21(1) Singapore 
Journal of Tropical Geography 1-5, 1. 
84 Roxanne L. Doty, Imperial Encounters. The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations 
(Minneapolis [Mn], University of Minnesota Press 1996) 66. 
 
85 Nicholas B. King, ‘Security, Disease, Commerce: Ideologies of Postcolonial Global Health’ (2002) 
32(5/6) Social Studies of Science 763-778, 772.  
86 See for example a report regarding these later outbreaks, filed from one of the laboratories visited by 
Senator Lugar in 2010: Josh Kron, ‘In a Remote Ugandan Lab, Encounters with the Zika Virus and 
Mosquitoes Decades Ago’, New York Times, 6th April 2016. On the part-supersession of tropicality, see 
Gregory Bankoff, ‘Rendering the World Unsafe: ‘‘Vulnerability’’ as Western Discourse’ (2001) 25(1) 
Disasters 19–35. 
 
87 Guillaume Lachenal, ‘Lessons in Medical Nihilism. Virus Hunters, Neo-Liberalism and the AIDS 
Pandemic in Cameroon’, in P. Wenzel Geissler (ed), Para-States and Medical Science: Making African 
Global Health (Durham [NC], Duke University Press 2015) 103-141. 
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2007 Presidential election, not long before Lugar’s visit, ‘when roving mobs ruled the 
streets’.88 The laboratory would be ‘vulnerable to such upheaval’ again in the future, it 
was claimed, since only ‘a four-foot wall topped by barbed wire’ stood in the way of the 
terrorists entering KEMRI and acquiring anthrax, ebola or other potentially deadly 
agents’ (5).  
 
This description was reinforced by a picture of Senator Lugar looking out over a 
rudimentary barbed wire fence at the expanse of tin roofs in Kibera (3). In form the image 
evokes those of earlier US politicians at the Berlin Wall, such as that of Robert Kennedy 
in 1962.89 In both cases the travelling statesman stands on friendly territory (the 
laboratory, West Berlin), looking at a zone of threat beyond the perimeter. The differences 
between the images, understood in chronotopical terms, are indicative of the shift in how 
America’s strategic interests have been defined since the end of the Cold War. That shift 
is reflected in the changing focus of bioweapons control efforts, discussed above, from 
state to non-state sources and from Central Europe to the Global South, in the same 
period. Thus, there is a clear contrast between the highly-governed space of the former 
German Democratic Republic, penned in by a wall so secure that it temporally 
immobilized those within, and the presumptively ungoverned space of the Nairobi slum 
which permits unchecked mobility.90 If the danger in the former case is unitary and 
somehow predictable, the latter is marked by ‘polymorphous threats’, only partially 
apprehended.91 This distinction is amplified by the stealthy and unobserved nature of any 
possible bioterrorist attack, which involves a process of diffusion rather than the use of 
discrete weapons, as would have been the case with the kind of nuclear conflict expected 
during the Cold War.92 
 
 The changed geopolitical configuration was evoked still more directly by the 
report in its description of the regional context. Just like the KEMRI laboratory, the 
Kenyan state itself was presented as enclave and frontline due to its ‘close proximity’ to 
countries ‘which were known terrorist recruiting grounds’ (3). A map showed East Africa, 
the Horn of Africa along with the southwestern corner of the Arabian peninsula. The 
Senator drew particular attention to the ‘long and porous border’ which separated Kenya 
from ‘Somalia where Al Qaeda-linked Shebaab insurgents control large territories’.93 A 
contemporaneous survey for the US Congress on counterterrorism in the region echoed 
this concern and also highlighted the internal decay of neighbouring states. These had 
been undermined by ‘weak law enforcement and judicial institutions, pervasive 
                                                 
88 Jason Straziuso, ‘US Team on Africa Bioterror Prevention Tour to Study Ways to Stop Future Attacks’, 
Associated Press, 12th November 2010. 
 
89 Robert Kennedy, then US Attorney General, pictured with Willy Brandt, then Governing Mayor of West 
Berlin, 22nd February 1962 = http://travelingboy.com/ed/berlin_wall4.jpg 
 
90 See Ian Klinke, ‘Chronopolitics a Conceptual Matrix’ (2012) 37 Progress in Human Geography 673-
690, 682. 
91 Stephen J Collier, Andrew Lakoff and Paul Rabinow, ‘Biosecurity: Toward an Anthropology of the 
Contemporary’ (2004) 20(5) Anthropology Today 3-7, 3. 
92 Sonja Kittlesen, ‘Conceptualizing Biorisk: Dread Risk and the Threat of Bioterrorism in Europe’ (2009) 
40(1) Security Dialogue 51–71, 68. 
 
93 ‘US Senator Voices Bioterrorism Fears Over E.African Labs’, AFP, 12 November 2010. 
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corruption, and in some cases complicity with terrorist activity’.94 Again Somalia’s ‘20-
year absence of central authority’ furnished the ultimate exemplar.95  
 
The mood of anxiety here is sustained by frequent evocation of the tropical 
imaginary of malign profusion which I have discussed above. The security threat is again 
seen as endogenous to Africa as whole: ‘the world’s soft underbelly for terrorism’ in the 
words of former US Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice.96 The ‘burgeoning 
populations’ of states contributed to their vulnerability according to the report (5), a point 
echoed by then Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, speaking in support of the Global 
Pathogen Surveillance Act.  
One of the true ‘‘nightmare’’ scenarios—of a bioterrorist attack or a naturally 
occurring disease—involves a contagious biological agent moving swiftly through 
a crowded urban area of a densely populated developing nation. 
 
   
These interventions are marked by what Sundhya Pahuja has described as the fear 
of a ‘reversion to the primordial’ on the part of states in the global south.97  The spatio-
temporal form here is the spectrum: discrete nation-state units make progress along a 
developmental continuum with the likes of Somalia at one end and the states of north 
western Europe on the other. This progress has been the aim of development policies 
since the late colonial period.98 But, as Pahuja suggests, it is always uncertain, reversible. 
Thus, policymakers and experts in development economics and international relations 
from the 1980s onwards worried that the sovereignty gained by African and other states 
on decolonization was a sham, a purely juridical artefact, wholly dependent on outside 
support and the norms of international law, rather than a consequence of states being able 
to assert themselves ‘empirically’ at the frontier and throughout their own territory.99 In 
reality, they claimed, most African states were potentially failed states, always capable of 
reverting to their true, ungoverned nature and thereby undermining the global order. In 
economic terms, the risk of sovereign default by such states endangered the entire world 
financial system. In security terms, state collapse risked regional and global stability.  
 
 
 
                                                 
94 Lauren Ploch, Countering Terrorism in East Africa:  The U.S. Response (Washington DC, Congressional 
Research Service 2010) 3. 
95 Lauren Ploch, Countering Terrorism in East Africa:  The U.S. Response (Washington DC, Congressional 
Research Service 2010) 6. 
96 Quoted in Lauren Ploch, Countering Terrorism in East Africa:  The U.S. Response (Washington DC, 
Congressional Research Service 2010) 3, 11-14. 
97 Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Technologies of Empire: IMF Conditionality and the Reinscription of the North/South 
Divide’ (2000) 13(4) Leiden Journal of International Law 749-813, 794. 
98 See further, Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development. The Making and Unmaking of the Third World 
(Princeton [NJ], Princeton University Press 1995) c.1. 
99 Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1993); Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in 
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The Shrinking Globe  
 
The tropical continent and the ungoverned slum, on the one hand, and the American 
homeland, on the other, were drawn into proximity by the contemporary process of time-
space compression or what we might call the chronotope of the ‘shrinking globe’. Thus, 
Lugar noted the danger from global pandemics, like the outbreak of swine flu (H1N1) in 
2009, which had ‘spread across the world in 96 hours’ (5). That threat was even greater 
where diseases were deliberately transmitted. In the same vein, the preamble to the Global 
Pathogen Surveillance Act stated that:  
A contagious pathogen engineered as a biological weapon and developed, tested, 
produced, or released in a foreign country could quickly spread to the United 
States… in a matter of days, before any effective quarantine or isolation measures 
could be implemented.100  
The rhetorical force of this chronotope comes from the widespread apprehension, 
as Nicholas King notes, that distance no longer matters.101 The cordon sanitaire around 
the richer regions of the world has been abolished, it is feared, by the speed at which 
pathogens can now travel. Space has been overcome by time.102 The reification of 
economic globalization as an implacable reconstructive force finds equivalent expression 
here in combined health and security discourses.103  
 
  At least two responses to this spatio-temporal compression in health and more 
generally are possible: an embrace of the cosmopolitan, which accepts the new 
spatialization; or a restoration of the national, which attempts to restore the old. The first 
is found in much academic work on global infectious disease control. Writers commonly 
frame the spread of contagious diseases in the idiom of waning territorial control and 
limited state sovereignty. Bugs ‘don’t carry passports’ nor do they ‘recognize the 
boundaries set by national borders’.104 Public health responses equally need to transcend 
the nation state. The SARS outbreak in 2003, which saw a secretive Chinese government 
outflanked by on-line notification systems fed by unofficial sources, was accordingly 
described by David Fidler as ‘the first Post-Westphalian’ contagion.105 Many of these 
texts call forth a new post-national subject which faces and responds to ‘global health 
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challenges’.106 This subject often goes by the name of ‘the international community’ or 
‘humanity’ tout court.107  
An obvious alternative to abolishing national space in this way would be to make it 
matter again. The extract from the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act, quoted above, 
suggests as much by specifically naming the United States, rather than the world at large, 
as the potential target of long-range bioterrorism and equally as the agent of its own self-
protection. Lugar too took care to highlight the specific risk to the homeland, calling up 
the spectre of what he called ‘agro-terrorism’: 
The intentional introduction of a disease such as hoof and mouth … [which][ could 
derail American agriculture, leading to quarantines, trade barriers, and damage to 
the reputation of American products (5). 
This particularistic concern is more than territorial in scope, however. It extends beyond 
the physical space of the United States, to include individuals from the global north 
circulating as travellers in Africa. Official reports on the work of US medical installations 
in Kenya, for example, point out the double benefit which they confer: not only on the 
local population, but crucially also on American soldiers posted in the region and at risk 
from endemic diseases.108 The report also references another mobile and vulnerable figure 
of globalization, the tourist, noting the case of a Dutch citizen infected with Marburg 
fever after visiting a cave in a national park in Uganda (4).109 These two examples make 
clear that the national interest can no longer be asserted through a simple hardening of 
the domestic frontier. The demands of economic globalization suggest that recreating the 
sharply segmented national time-spaces of the Westphalian order is unthinkable. 
Ultimately for Lugar, 
the safety and health of Americans requires partnerships here, in Africa, on African 
soil where the pathogens originate.  We can’t wait for the bugs to spread (4). 
 
 
The Laboratory and the Chain 
 
The partnerships recommended by Senator Lugar and the funding he sought from 
Congress were to be focussed on the final and most urgent site of vulnerability: at the 
micro-scale of each laboratory and its immediate surroundings. The report, as well as 
related newspaper articles, provided extensive detail on the actual state of the installations 
inspected. They observed ‘the broken windows, simple padlocks, lack of entry 
monitoring, and close proximity to water and air access points’ of the Ugandan unit (3). 
Text and photographs highlighted that rooms storing sensitive material were ‘padlocked 
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only, [with] freezers chock full of samples … stored only in plastic bags too many of 
which were unidentified’ and ‘cooler bags of disease samples … stockpiled in corridors’ 
(3). Rooms where researchers diagnosed haemorrhagic fevers, like Ebola and Marburg, 
were easily accessible. There were no incinerators to destroy samples, with waste left 
‘lying around’ in garbage bags next to a storm drain instead.110 Systems for inventorying 
pathogens, as well as staffing levels were also found wanting. A picture showed that the 
relevant ‘log book’ at Entebbe was in fact a school jotter with a list of events entered in 
biro, including, as the text noted, a ‘suspected case of ANTHRAX [sic] outbreak’ (4). 
Where once this ‘1920s-era’ research facility ‘was teeming with staff’, its funding had 
dwindled and it ‘now has just 11 technical staff attempting to meet the demands of the 
entire country’ (4). The lead scientist, was depicted in terms, both diminutive and 
pathetic, as ‘a gregarious woman known as Dr Rose’ who used ‘a simple camera held up 
to a microscope to identify and share her findings’ (4).  
 
 In this account the East African laboratory is itself a chronotope with 
interdependent spatial and temporal aspects. Spatially it is figured as a zone of disorder. 
Things that matter, like security measures, records, staff and pathogens themselves, are 
either out of place, unaccounted for, absent or unseen. This disorder means that, 
temporally, the laboratory has fallen behind. It is no longer able to perform and monitor 
scientific routines to the international standard needed for effective infectious disease 
control. As former Senator Joseph Biden put it when introducing the Global Pathogen 
Surveillance Act, the ‘weak medical infrastructure [of] developing nations’ is one of ‘the 
weak links in global disease monitoring and surveillance’.111 The imagery here implies 
that US biosecurity depends on the simultaneous strength of all the links in a worldwide 
chain of laboratories.112 Like the domino theory popular in US security discourses during 
the Cold War, this further chronotope presents the vulnerability of the smaller unit as a 
threat to the whole.113 Unlike that theory, it widens the focus of concern beyond the 
various nation states, to all sources of weakness, state and non-state alike.  
 
The mood of anxiety about falling behind in laboratory practice is felt by local 
scientists as much as by security experts in the global north. Thus, the lead Kenyan 
pathologist at the time of the visit told Lugar that 
Our facilities were built 42 years ago without consideration for biosafety or 
security. We want to do the right thing. We need an upgrade (5). 
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That claim is rooted in the history of the laboratories visited, which is one of colonial 
foundation, followed by expansion and Africanization after independence in the 1960s.114 
Investigators in Kenya, Uganda and in many other new states in that period saw 
themselves as working to build new nations by participating as equals in a universally 
defined science.115 With adequate facilities and funding their research would be 
‘synchronous’ with that conducted in the former imperial metropoles.116 For such 
scientists, as Warwick Anderson has put it,  
the laboratory represented an exemplary space of control, purity and precision, a 
model disciplinary site.117 
But economic decline and structural adjustment in the 1980s pulled apart the temporal 
and spatial coordinates of this aspiration. Drastic cuts in staffing and budgets helped to 
create the disorder documented by Lugar’s report. Laboratory facilities disintegrated and 
African scientific research was re-localized and relegated to a backward state.118 At least 
some of the appeal of US biosecurity discourses to East African scientists lies, in a desire 
to re-establish synchronicity and to reconnect the physical places of local laboratories 
with the international space of the biosciences. 
 
  
Conclusion: Space, Time and the Imperial Present 
  
This paper is intended as an invitation to take seriously the situated and rhetorical nature 
of global health law, as modelled by nodal governance theory. The field is currently 
dominated by two analytics: an instrumentalist concern with security on the one hand and 
a strongly normative humanitarianism on the other.119 Each is underpinned by a model of 
norm diffusion, which as I have argued neglects the cultures and capacities of the diverse 
national nodes, institutions and fora, which resist, implement, transform and initiate 
global health governance. Each also reproduces and is legitimated by a chronotope of 
universality, beyond time and the particularities of place, where all of humanity faces the 
threat of contagion and is challenged by the suffering of afflicted individuals regardless 
of nationality. The governance mood is one of anxiety, chased with optimism about the 
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capacity of technocrats, philanthropists and scientists to find effective solutions.120 The 
jurisdiction claimed is global, beyond the nation state and the limitations of Westphalian 
international law. The effect is that of a ‘soothing balm through which difference is 
incorporated into sameness’ and historic inequality elided.121 That this moralistic 
universalism is in good faith, that it seeks a better world, should not be denied. But it does 
not arrive into a world innocent of empire, of racial hierarchy and domination. 
Concentrating on biosecurity, I have sought to show that contemporary articulations of 
global health are likely to be marked by the traces of colonial thought and practices.122 
These practices are revealed by a close reading of persuasive efforts like that of Senator 
Lugar in East Africa, paying attention to the concrete forms and imagery used, as well as 
the audiences at which it they are directed. As Roxanne Doty suggested, earlier 
encounters between Europeans (understood broadly) and Africans ‘continue to be 
implicated in the representational practices by which boundaries are drawn and 
international identifies are constructed’.123 
 
Spatio-temporal figures were seen to be key in this review, not primarily due to 
their categorical nature, but because of their observable role in defining the scale and 
extent of relevant jurisdictional claims. The developmental state, with its forward-looking 
time, limited by national boundaries, had been challenged in the context of health and 
scientific research, by a fragmentation of space and a chaotic pluralization of 
temporalities in the period of structural adjustment. To the American observer, border 
regions and enclaves, like slums and laboratories, had escaped the control of central 
authorities and thus, also the forward drive of responsible national development. 
However, global health security does not seek to respond by restoring segmented national 
times, subject to the direction of post-colonial states.124 Its ambition is not to rehabilitate 
the states of the global south in toto as autonomous actors in health and other sectors. 
Rather it wishes to build the discrete capacity needed to allow ‘real time’ notification of 
outbreaks, whatever their source and wherever in the world. Towards that end, and in the 
effort to secure pathogens against acquisition by terrorists, it looks physically to 
reconstruct sites, such as laboratories, and to stimulate self-discipline by key actors, such 
as researchers, through financial incentives and the promulgation of ethics codes. An 
extended genealogy of these strategies, though worthy of further study, is beyond the 
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scope of this paper.125 What can be noted, along with Alison Bashford, are the affinities 
between this mode of contemporary post-national, global health governance and the 
network of surveillance facilities and communications systems typical of imperial health 
in the first half of the 20th century, the attempt to bypass the local and the national in the 
name of the universal.126  
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